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Abstract
We analyze the impact of market share on advertising and pricing decisions by ¯rms that
sell to loyal, non-shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through an information
intermediary or \gatekeeper." In equilibrium the ¯rm with the smaller loyal market advertises
more aggressively but prices less competitively than the ¯rm with the larger loyal market, and
there is no equilibrium in which both ¯rms advertise with probability 1. The results di®er
signi¯cantly from earlier literature which assumes all prices are revealed to shoppers and ¯nds
that the ¯rm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The
predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price
comparison websites such as Shopper.com.
¤This paper combines independent research by Arnold and Saliba from the University of Delaware and Li and
Zhang from Indiana University. It was supported by the University of Delaware College of Business and Economics
Research Grant Program. Corresponding author, arnoldm@lerner.udel.edu.1 Introduction
The increased adoption of the Internet as a commercial platform has led to an array of online
information intermediaries or \gatekeepers" that provide consumers with price and product in-
formation. Websites such as Shopper.com and Mysimon.com enable consumers to easily compare
prices for a homogeneous good o®ered for sale by several online retailers.1 In traditional markets
newspapers, trade journals, and brokers often serve the role of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers provide
price information to shoppers who search for the lowest possible price. Other consumers, who we
classify as \loyal," bypass the gatekeeper and purchase directly from a preferred retailer. Baye and
Morgan (2001) explicitly incorporate a gatekeeper in a clearinghouse model.2 A critical simplifying
assumption in their analysis and in subsequent clearinghouse models with a gatekeeper is that loyal
customers are allocated equally across ¯rms; ¯rms have symmetric market shares. A central ¯nding
by Baye and Morgan is that in equilibrium ¯rms adopt symmetric mixed pricing and advertising
strategies. This important result provides an explanation for price dispersion in online markets,
even in the presence of an information intermediary capable of providing complete price information
to consumers. However, observed patterns of price dispersion in many online markets reveal persis-
tent di®erences in pricing and advertising behavior across ¯rms.3 Figure 1 provides an illustrative
example based on prices advertised on the price comparison site Shopper.com by Dell and Buy.com
for a SanDisk 2GB Secure Digital Card. Dell advertised a price in 84 percent of the observations
while Buy.com advertised in only 42 percent. In addition, whenever both ¯rms advertised, Buy.com
advertised the lower price. These observed patterns are at odds with the theoretical prediction that
equilibrium pricing and advertising strategies are symmetric.
In light of this discrepancy between theory and observed behavior, in their survey of the literature
1According to E-consultancy, in the UK, price comparison websites generated revenues between 120 and 140
million Euros in 2005.
2Information providers or \gatekeepers" are not unique to the Internet or new to the economics literature. In his
seminal work, Stigler (1961) argued that if the size of a market characterized by price dispersion increased su±ciently,
then it would become pro¯table for a third-party to collect and sell information about the distribution of prices.
Moreover, Stigler predicted that there would be a \tendency toward monopoly in the provision of information." In
later theoretical work, the information providers envisioned by Stigler appeared in the background of several models
of equilibrium price dispersion. For example, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) assume that for a fee consumers obtain full
price information. Varian (1980) assumes that some consumers have access to a list of prices across di®erent retailers.
These informed consumers buy at the lowest advertised price. Other consumers are uninformed and shop randomly.
3Empirical work has documented widespread price dispersion in online markets as well as asymmetric pricing
behavior by ¯rms. The literature o®ers a number of possible explanations (including brand equity, reputation,
product availability, website design, or customer service). Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) present a nice survey
of this literature.
1on price dispersion in online markets Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) note that \little is known
about the general clearinghouse model with asymmetric consumers...Further theoretical work on
clearinghouse models with consumer asymmetries and positive listing fees would be a useful addition
to the literature." In this paper we explore how asymmetries in the allocation of consumers across
¯rms impact advertising and pricing decisions in a market with an information gatekeeper. We
present a duopoly model in which a larger share of the loyal customers is allocated to one of the
two ¯rms. The model is particularly pertinent to online markets which are often characterized by
¯rms with familiar names which capture a large share of the market and smaller websites which are






















Figure 1: Price for SanDisk 2 GB Secure Digital Card on Shopper.com
Our analysis demonstrates that asymmetric loyal market shares impact ¯rm advertising and
pricing behavior in ways that are not revealed by the analysis with symmetric market shares. The
probability a ¯rm advertises through the gatekeeper is decreasing in the size of the ¯rm's loyal
market. The ¯rm with the smaller loyal market is more likely to advertise in an attempt to increase
its market share by capturing shoppers, but it prices less competitively. The equilibrium mixed
strategy pricing distribution of the this ¯rm is less competitive than the pricing strategy adopted
by the ¯rm with the larger loyal market. The ¯rm with more loyal customers avoids the opportunity
cost of discounting its price by adopting a lower advertising probability. However, when it does
advertise, it adopts a more competitive pricing strategy so that the higher opportunity cost of
selling to loyal customers at a discounted price is justi¯ed by the higher probability of capturing
the shoppers. These results are consistent with the example presented in Figure 1. They also help
2explain the absence of well known retailers on some price comparison sites.4
Our model also extends the literature on pricing strategies adopted by asymmetric ¯rms in the
absence of a gatekeeper. Narasimhan (1988) considers equilibrium pricing strategies in a market in
which ¯rms have asymmetric loyal customer segments and shoppers automatically observe the price
charged by each ¯rm. (Firms make no advertising decision in Narasimhan's model.) In a duopoly
model he ¯nds that the ¯rm with the larger loyal segment charges higher prices on average. The
¯rm with the smaller loyal segment prices more aggressively because it has less to lose from charging
a lower price to its loyal base in order to attract shoppers. These results are extended to the n
¯rm case by Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992). They demonstrate that only the ¯rms with the
two smallest loyal segments compete for shoppers. These two ¯rms adopt mixed strategy pricing
distributions and the smallest ¯rm prices more aggressively than the second smallest ¯rm. All
larger ¯rms advertise the monopoly price and sell only to their loyal, non-shopping customers.5
These results highlight the central trade-o® facing a ¯rm in a market with both loyal customers and
shoppers; setting a low price to attract shoppers requires selling at a discount to loyal customers
who are willing to pay a higher price, while setting a high price to extract more surplus from loyal
customers fails to attract shoppers and results in fewer units being sold.
By explicitly incorporating the ¯rm's decision about whether or not to advertise, our model
allows ¯rms a broader set of strategies with which to balance the trade-o® between charging a high
price to extract surplus from loyal customers and charging a low price to capture shoppers. In
a market with a gatekeeper a ¯rm can increase the probability that it captures shoppers either
by advertising with a very high probability, so it is likely to advertise and capture the shoppers
when the competition chooses not to advertise, or by setting a low price when it does advertise to
ensure that it captures the shoppers even if the competition also chooses to advertise. Importantly,
attempting to capture shoppers by advertising with a high probability does not necessitate charging
a low price and su®ering the coincident reduction in surplus extracted from loyal customers.
In contrast to the previous literature, we ¯nd that the ¯rm with the larger loyal segment charges a
4For example, Baye, Morgan and Scholten's (2004) data set of over four million prices for consumer electronics
products collected from Shopper.com in the period from August 2000 through March 2001 did not contain a single
observation from circuitcity.com or bestbuy.com. Circuit City established an online retail presence in 1999, and Best
Buy followed in 2000. As Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) note, this absence also may be explained by the fact
that Circuit City and Best Buy were relatively new participants in the online market at the time their data were
collected.
5Kocas and Kiyak (2006) show that these results continue to apply even if reservation prices di®er across con-
sumers.
3lower price, on average, when it chooses to advertise, than the ¯rm with the smaller loyal segment.
This does not imply that the ¯rm with the larger loyal segment ignores the opportunity cost of
selling to its loyal base at a discounted price. Rather, it balances this trade-o® by choosing a lower
advertising probability. Through this advertising strategy the ¯rm with the larger loyal segment is
less likely to sell to its loyal customers at a discount and is more likely to concede shoppers than is
the ¯rm with the smaller loyal segment. However, when it does advertise, the larger ¯rm discounts
more heavily than its competition and is more likely to capture the shoppers.
Our model is introduced in section 2. The ¯rms' optimal strategies are derived in section 3.
Section 4 presents the optimal strategy of the gatekeeper, and equilibrium analysis is presented in
section 5. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Our model builds on Baye and Morgan (2001) and Narasimhan (1988) to investigate the role of
asymmetric loyal customer segments in a market with an information gatekeeper. We assume a
continuum of consumers, each of whom has a reservation price r for one unit of a homogeneous
good. The measure of consumers is normalized to unity. The good is provided by two ¯rms that
produce the good at a constant marginal cost m. Without loss of generality, we set m = 0: Each
¯rm establishes a price pi, i = 1;2 for the good. A ¯rm may choose to advertise its price through
a monopoly information gatekeeper which charges a fee © for advertising services. Consumers fall
into one of three categories. A fraction L1 of the consumers are loyal to ¯rm 1. A fraction L2 are
loyal to ¯rm 2: The remaining fraction S = 1 ¡L1 ¡L2 are shoppers. We assume L2 < L1; so that
¯rm 2 is arbitrarily designated as the ¯rm with the smaller loyal customer base, and we assume
S > 0: Loyal customers purchase only from their preferred ¯rm (provided the price does not exceed
r): Shoppers have no ¯rm preference. Rather, they purchase at the lowest price advertised through
the gatekeeper. If neither ¯rm advertises a price, or if both ¯rms advertise the same price, then the
shoppers randomly choose one of the two ¯rms and purchase from that ¯rm if its price does not
exceed r.6 Firms cannot discriminate between shoppers and non-shoppers; they charge the same
6The assumption that shoppers are indi®erent between ¯rms when no price is advertised is reasonable because
in equilibrium any ¯rm that does not advertise a price with the gatekeeper will charge the monopoly price r: The
nature of our results do not change if shoppers are allocated to the ¯rms in proportion to each ¯rm's loyal customer
base when neither ¯rm advertises a price.
4price to all consumers.7 This framework is equivalent to the Baye and Morgan (2001) framework
with two ¯rms if L1 = L2, and to the Narasimhan (1988) framework if © = 0:
We consider subgame perfect equilibria of the following three stage game. In the ¯rst stage the
gatekeeper sets the advertising fee ©: In the second stage the ¯rms observe © and then simultane-
ously determine the prices pi; i = 1;2 they will charge and the probabilities ®i; i = 1;2; that they
will advertise with the gatekeeper. Finally, consumers make purchase decisions. Provided prices do
not exceed r; non-shoppers purchase from their preferred ¯rms and shoppers purchase at the lowest
price available.
3 The Firms' Problem
Each ¯rm must determine the probability ®i that it will advertise with the gatekeeper and the price
pi that it will charge. The optimal values of ®i and pi must balance the trade-o® between charging
the reservation value r to extract the maximum possible surplus from loyal customers versus seeking
to capture shoppers by advertising more frequently and setting a lower price while incurring the
advertising fee ©: To characterize the potential gain from advertising, we compare the expected
return for a ¯rm that chooses not to advertise with the expected return if the ¯rm does advertise.
A ¯rm i that does not advertise sells to its loyal customers, plus one-half of the shoppers if
shoppers do not ¯nd a price advertised at the gatekeeper's site. Because the competing ¯rm j
advertises with probability ®j; the expected number of customers who purchase from ¯rm i when
it does not advertise is Li + 1
2(1 ¡ ®j)S: Because the ¯rm's pro¯t from any given transaction is
maximized by selling at the reservation price r; a ¯rm that chooses not to advertise will charge a
price of r. Thus, the expected pro¯t E¼N











If ¯rm i advertises, then it sells to its Li loyal customers as well as to all S shoppers only if
¯rm i's price is the lowest advertised price. If ¯rm i's price is not the lowest advertised price,
then it sells only to its Li loyal customers. Let Fj(p) = Pr(pj · p) denote the advertised price
distribution function adopted by ¯rm j: Assuming ¯rm i advertises a price p; the probability that
¯rm j advertises and charges a price pj < p is ®jFj(p): Therefore, the probability that shoppers
7See Chen, Iyer, and Pudmanabhan (2002), and Baye and Morgan (2002) for models in which sellers discriminate
between subscribers and non-subscribers. These papers do not consider asymmetric loyal markets segments.
5purchase from ¯rm i is 1 ¡ ®jFj(p),8 and the expected pro¯t E¼A




i (p) = (Li + (1 ¡ ®jFj (p))S)p ¡ ©: (2)
The advertising fee © is central to the ¯rm's decision. In particular, if © ¸ rS=2; then neither ¯rm
will advertise because the maximum gain a ¯rm can achieve by advertising is rS=2:9 In the analysis
below we assume 0 < © < rS=2:
3.1 Preliminaries
In this subsection we present several preliminary results that place restrictions on the ¯rms' equilib-
rium behavior. These restrictions facilitate the analysis of the equilibrium pricing and advertising
strategies presented in subsection 3.2. Because these preliminary results are similar to results in
the existing literature and rely on well know arguments, proofs are presented in the appendix. In
the analysis below, let p
i denote the minimum price charged by ¯rm i; i = 1;2:
Lemma 1 Assume that both ¯rms advertise with strictly positive probability. Then in any equilib-
rium neither ¯rm adopts a pure pricing strategy when advertising.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium the lower support of each ¯rm's equilibrium mixed strategy advertised
price distribution must be the same, p
i = p
j ´ p:
Lemma 3 In equilibrium each ¯rm's mixed strategy advertised price distribution must be atomless
over the interval [p;r) and must be de¯ned continuously over the interval [p;r]: Furthermore, only
one ¯rm can have a mass point at the upper support r:
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium both ¯rms must advertise with strictly positive probability, and there
is no equilibrium in which both ¯rms advertise with probability ®1 = ®2 = 1:
8This probability assumes that neither ¯rm has a mass points at the price p so a situation in which both ¯rms
advertise the same price is not a concern. The analysis in section 3.1 below demonstrates that mass points cannot
exist in equilibrium, except at the upper support of the price distribution for one ¯rm.
9To see this, note that if neither ¯rm advertises, then ¯rm i will charge the reservation price r and capture 1/2
of the shoppers. The largest possible gain from advertising occurs when ¯rm i advertises the reservation price r and
¯rm j does not advertise. In this case ¯rm i captures the remaining 1=2 of the shoppers at the reservation price r
which increases ¯rm i's pro¯t by rS=2:
63.2 The Firms' Optimal Strategies
Each ¯rm must determine both an optimal advertising strategy and an optimal pricing strategy
conditional on the decision to advertise. If a ¯rm does not advertise, then it charges the monopoly
price r: The preliminary results presented in subsection 3.1 imply that in any equilibrium, both
¯rms advertise with strictly positive probability. In addition, at least one of the ¯rms must adopt
a mixed advertising strategy. Conditional upon advertising, the preliminary results imply that
both ¯rms adopt mixed strategy advertised price distributions. The equilibrium advertised price
distributions must be continuous and have a common support [p;r]; they can have no mass points,
except at the upper support r; and only one ¯rm's distribution, at most, can have a mass point at
r:
At this point, it is useful to de¯ne ~ pi as the minimum price that ¯rm i will ever consider
advertising through the gatekeeper. In particular, ~ pi equates the return ~ pi(Li + S) ¡ © from
advertising and capturing the shoppers with the return from not advertising and charging the
reservation price r: Thus, ~ pi satis¯es
~ pi(Li + S) ¡ © = E¼
N
i (r):
Note that if ~ pi < ~ pj; then ¯rm i will advertise with probability ®i = 1: This holds because Lemma
2 implies that the lower support p of each ¯rm's equilibrium advertised price distribution must be
the same. Thus, if ~ pi < ~ pj; then ~ pi < p because the common lower support p of the advertised price
distributions cannot be less than the lowest price ~ pj that ¯rm j would ever choose to advertise.
Because pi(Li+S)¡© is strictly increasing in pi and ¯rm i can capture all shoppers by advertising
p > ~ pi; it follows that ¯rm i's return p(Li+S)¡© from advertising the price pi = p with probability
one exceeds the expected return E¼N
i (r) gained by not advertising and charging the reservation price
r: The fact that the two ¯rms may be willing to establish di®erent minimum advertised prices but
must adopt the same minimum price p in equilibrium enables us to place additional structure on
the equilibrium advertising strategies.
Proposition 5 The ¯rm with the larger loyal customer base (¯rm 1) will advertise with probability
®1 < 1 in any equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose ®1 = 1: Then Lemma 4 implies that ®2 < 1: By de¯nition of ~ pi; ®1 = 1 and











7where the inequality follows from the fact that L1 > L2 by assumption. Lemma 2 and ~ p2 < ~ p1
imply ~ p2 < p; so the expected return p(Li + S) ¡ © that ¯rm 2 obtains by advertising p2 = p and
capturing all shoppers is greater than EN
2 (r): But this implies it is optimal for ¯rm 2 to advertise
with probability ®2 = 1 which contradicts ®2 < 1: ¥
Proposition 5 further narrows the set of possible equilibrium advertising strategies; in any equi-
librium either both ¯rms adopt mixed advertising strategies, or ¯rm 1 adopts a mixed advertising
strategy and ¯rm 2 advertises with probability one. As demonstrated in Proposition 6 below, which
of these two cases occurs depends upon the advertising fee © established by the gatekeeper.
Proposition 6 If the gatekeeper sets the advertising fee © such that 0 < © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2, then ¯rm








and ¯rm 2 adopts a pure advertising strategy ®2 = 1; and the mixed advertised price strategies are
characterized by the cumulative distribution functions
F1(p) =
r(p(L1 + S) ¡ (rL1 + ©))
p(rS ¡ ©)
; and
F2(p) = 1 ¡
L1(r ¡ p) + ©
pS
on the interval [p;r] where p =
rL1+©
L1+S :
If the gatekeeper sets © such that
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 · © < rS=2; then both ¯rms adopt mixed advertising
strategies





(rS ¡ 2©)(2L1 + S ¡ L2)
rS(L2 + S)
;
and the mixed advertised price strategies are characterized by the cumulative distribution functions
F1(p) =




r(L1 + S)(p(L2 + S) ¡ rL2 ¡ 2©)
p(rS ¡ 2©)(2L1 + S ¡ L2)
; on [p;r];




The results of Proposition 6 enable us to more carefully consider how the size of each ¯rm's loyal
customer base impacts the ¯rm's decision to advertise as well as how competitively it prices when
the ¯rm does choose to advertise. Propositions 7 and 8 provide two general results. Additional
comparative statics results are explored in the subsequent discussion.
Proposition 7 In any equilibrium the ¯rm 2 (with the smaller loyal market) advertises with a
higher probability than the ¯rm 1, i.e., ®2 > ®1.
Proof. If ¯rm 2 adopts ®2 = 1; then Proposition 5 implies ®1 < ®2: If ¯rm 2 sets ®2 < 1; then
from Proposition 6
®2 ¡ ®1 =









(rS ¡ 2©)(2L1 ¡ 2L2)
rS(L2 + S)
> 0
where the inequality follows from the assumptions that © < rS=2 and L1 > L2: ¥
Proposition 8 In any equilibrium, conditional upon advertising, the price p2 advertised by ¯rm 2
is stochastically larger (in the sense of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance) than the price p1 advertised
by ¯rm 1. Furthermore, the equilibrium advertised price distribution of ¯rm 2 (and only ¯rm 2)
always has a mass point at the monopoly price r:
Proof. The price p2 advertised by ¯rm 2 is stochastically larger than p1 if 1¡F2(p) ¸ 1¡F1(p)
for all p 2 [p;r]: Alternatively, p2 is stochastically larger than p1 if F2(p) · F1(p) for p 2 [p;r]:
Suppose 0 < © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2: Then for p · p < r;
F1(p) ¡ F2(p) =
© (L1 (p ¡ r) + pS ¡ ©)
pS (rS ¡ ©)
:
The denominator is positive because © < rS=2 by assumption. Evaluated at p =
rL1+©
L1+S ; the
numerator equals 0. Because the numerator is strictly increasing in p; the numerator is strictly
positive for all p > p:
Now suppose
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 · © < rS=2: Then for p · p < r;
F1(p) ¡ F2(p) =
r(L1 ¡ L2)(p(L2 + S) ¡ rL2 ¡ 2©)
p(rS ¡ 2©)(2L1 + S ¡ L2)
:
The denominator is positive because © < rS=2 and L2 < L1: Evaluated at p =
rL2+2©
L2+S the numerator
is 0. Because the numerator is strictly increasing in p; the numerator is strictly positive for all p > p:
9Finally, note that F1(r) = 1 for any value of © < rS=2; while F2(r) < 1; so ¯rm 2's advertised
price distribution has a mass point at r while ¯rm 1's does not. ¥
Propositions 7 and 8 imply that although ¯rm 1 is less likely to advertise, ¯rm 1 adopts a more
aggressive pricing strategy when it does advertise. This is the exact opposite of the results found
by Narasimhan (1988) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992). In our model, the ability to refrain
from competition by choosing not to advertise serves as a substitute for pricing less aggressively for
¯rm 1. This alternative does not exist in the Narasimhan and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries models.
As in their models, ¯rm 1 has more to lose from its loyal base if it prices aggressively to attract
shoppers. However, rather than advertising relatively high prices (on average) to minimize this loss,
our results demonstrate that when ¯rms choose advertising strategies, ¯rm 1 hedges against this
loss by advertising with a lower probability. Because the opportunity cost of advertising a price
less than r and failing to capture the shoppers is greater for ¯rm 1 than for ¯rm 2; it only makes
sense for ¯rm 1 to advertise if it is intent on capturing the shoppers. This intent is re°ected in
the fact that under the equilibrium strategies p2 is stochastically larger than p1: Although ¯rm 2
adopts a less competitive advertised price distribution, because the magnitude of the opportunity
represented by the shoppers (as a percent of its total market) is greater for ¯rm 2, ¯rm 2 adopts
a higher advertising probability. Using the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), we might
think of the small ¯rm as adopting a \puppy-dog" strategy in which it advertises relatively high
prices in an attempt to appear non-threatening to ¯rm 1 while simultaneously adopting a higher
advertising probability so that on average it only captures shoppers in the event that ¯rm 1 chooses
not to advertise.
Comparative statics results with respect to the advertising fee © shed further light on the
equilibrium strategies. For example, an increase in © results in less competitive advertising and
pricing behavior. The reduction in competition appears in several ways. First, as © increases, ¯rms
are less likely to advertise (and so, are more likely to charge the monopoly price r): In particular, ®1
is decreasing in ©; and ®2 is decreasing in © if © ¸
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2; while if © <
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2; then ®2 = 1;
but an increase in © moves © closer the range in which ®2 < 1 and is decreasing in ©: Second, as
© increases, the minimum price p that either ¯rm will advertise increases. Finally, as © increases,
Fi(p) decreases for i = 1;2; so the expected advertised price, conditional on the ¯rm deciding to
advertise, increases. The e®ects all result in less competitive pricing as summarized in the following
proposition.
10Proposition 9 The expected price paid by any given buyer is increasing in the advertising fee ©:
It is also interesting to consider the impact of an increase in © on ¯rm pro¯ts. While an increase
in © results in less competitive pricing behavior, so consumers receive less surplus, the ¯rms also pay
a higher advertising fee to the gatekeeper. Thus, the overall impact on ¯rm pro¯tability is unclear.
Whether ¯rm pro¯t is increasing or decreasing in © depends upon whether both ¯rms adopt mixed
advertising strategies. Using the results of Proposition 6, ¯rm pro¯ts can be calculated as a function









if © is su±ciently small so that ¯rm 2 advertises with probability ®2 = 1; then ¯rm 1's pro¯t
is independent of the advertising fee, while ¯rm 2's pro¯t is strictly decreasing in ©: However, if
rS(L1¡L2)






2 = rL2 + ©;
so pro¯ts for both ¯rms are strictly increasing in ©: These results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 10 If 0 < © <
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2; then ¯rm 1's expected pro¯t is independent of the advertising
fee ©; while ¯rm 2's expected pro¯t is strictly decreasing in ©: If
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 · © < rS=2; then expected
pro¯ts for both ¯rms are strictly increasing in ©:
The di®erence in the impact of an increase in © on ¯rm pro¯ts follows from the fact that when
© is small, ¯rm 2 operates at a margin at which the bene¯t from advertising is strictly greater than
the bene¯t from not advertising. If © is small, then ¯rm 2 relies heavily on advertising and sales to
shoppers as a source of expected revenue, as evidenced by the fact that ®2 = 1 and E¼A
2 > E¼N
2 :
As a result, the gatekeeper can extract additional surplus from ¯rm 2 by increasing ©; and ¯rm 2's
expected pro¯t is decreasing in ©: Firm 1, on the other hand, only advertises to the extent that
advertising generates an expected return equal to the return rL1 that can be obtained by selling
only to its loyal base. Because ®2 = 1; the return to ¯rm 1 from not advertising depends only
on its loyal base (and is independent of the fraction of shoppers in the market). As a result, the
gatekeeper is unable to extract additional surplus from ¯rm 1 by changing ©:
If © is large, then, somewhat surprisingly, an increase in © actually generates an increase in
the expected pro¯ts of both ¯rms. Propositions 6 and 9 imply that an increase in © leads to less
competitive pricing and advertising strategies, and the ¯rms capture more of the surplus. However,
that this does not imply that the expected pro¯t of the gatekeeper is decreasing in ©: As © increases,
the gatekeeper's expected revenue is a larger fee multiplied by smaller advertising probabilities, so
11the total could be either increasing or decreasing. Proposition 12 below demonstrates that there are
conditions under which it is optimal for the gatekeeper to establish an advertising fee © >
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2:
The degree of asymmetry in the ¯rms' loyal market segments also impacts equilibrium strategies.
As evidenced by Proposition 6, ¯rm 2 will advertise with probability ®2 = 1 if © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2: While
it is intuitive that ¯rms are more likely to advertise if © is small, the bound on © provides additional
insight into this decision. The term L1 ¡ L2 can be interpreted as the degree of asymmetry in the
loyal market segments. For any positive advertising fee © < rS=2; if the asymmetry L1 ¡ L2
is su±ciently large, then ®2 = 1; while if L1 ¡ L2 is su±ciently small, then ®2 < 1: When the
asymmetry is large, which implies ¯rm 1 has a much larger share of the loyal customers in the
market, then ¯rm 2 advertises as aggressively as possible to ensure that it captures the shoppers
whenever ¯rm 1 does not advertise.
3.3 Special Cases: L1 = L2 and © = 0
As noted in the introduction, the Baye and Morgan model and the Narasimhan model can be viewed
as special cases of our model; in the Baye and Morgan model L1 = L2; and in the Narasimhan model
© = 0: The connection between these models and our model can be veri¯ed using the results of
Proposition 6. If L1 = L2 = L; then
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 = 0 so © ¸
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 always applies. Thus,












1+S : These results are consistent with those of Baye and Morgan with n = 2 and
adjustment for our unit demand assumption.







pS ; and p =
rL1
L1+S. These equilibrium expressions appear to con°ict with Narasimhan




Sp(L1+S) . However, these two seemingly di®erent equilibria
generate the same pro¯ts for the two ¯rms. When the advertising fee is zero, we have F2(r) = 1,
so ¯rm 2 does not have a mass point at the reservation price. Thus, for ¯rm 1, advertising and
charging r generates the same expected pro¯t as not advertising and charging r, because in either
case ¯rm 1 sells only to its loyal customers and pays a zero advertising fee to earn a pro¯t of rL1.
From another perspective, the expected advertised price distribution ®1F1(p) implied by our model
is







which is equivalent to the pricing distribution found by Narasimhan. More generally, if © = 0;
12then any convex combination of the equilibrium that is the special case of Proposition 6 with
© = 0 and the equilibrium that is characterized in Narasimhan is an equilibrium, and all of these
equilibria generate the same pro¯ts for both ¯rms. The equilibrium found by Narasimhan is just
one equilibrium from a continuum of equilibria.
4 The Gatekeeper's Problem
The gatekeeper correctly anticipates the advertising strategies adopted by the ¯rms and chooses its
advertising fee © to maximize its own expected pro¯t. We assume the gatekeeper has a ¯xed setup
cost k; so its expected pro¯t E¼G is
E¼G = (®1 + ®2)© ¡ k: (3)
The gatekeeper maximizes his expected pro¯t subject to the constraint that ¯rms will choose their
advertising strategies optimally as derived in Proposition 6. When choosing the optimal fee, the
gatekeeper faces a trade-o® between pro¯t per advertisement and the probability the ¯rms choose
to advertise. A higher fee will raise the pro¯t per advertisement, but will reduce the probability
the ¯rms advertise. Proposition 11 characterizes the gatekeeper's optimal strategy.




rS=4 if L1 < 1=3 + 2L2=3
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 if L1 ¸ 1=3 + 2L2=3:
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 demonstrates the gatekeeper's optimal strategy. The shaded areas represent all the
possible equilibrium combinations of L1 and L2 given the restriction that L1 > L2 and L1+L2 < 1.
The closer the pair (L1;L2) is to the 45-degree line, the less asymmetric are the ¯rms' loyal market
shares. When the asymmetry is relatively small, so the point (L1;L2) is in the vertically shaded
area, then the optimal fee for the gatekeeper is ©¤ = rS=4 and both ¯rms adopt mixed advertising
strategies. With greater asymmetry, so the point (L1;L2) is in the horizontally shaded region, the
gatekeeper's optimal fee is ©¤ =
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2. If L1 > (1 + 2L2)=3, then ©¤ =
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 > rS=4,
and ©¤ increases as L1 ¡ L2 increases. Thus, if the market is su±ciently asymmetric, then the
gatekeeper's advertising fee increases with the asymmetry. The primary reason for this is that if









Figure 2: The Gatekeeper's Optimal Advertising Fee
responds to ¯rm 2's strong desire to advertise by increasing © to extract surplus from ¯rm 2 to the
point at which any further increase in © would cause ¯rm 2 to revert to a mixed advertising strategy.
However, if the market is more symmetric, so L1 · (1 + 2L2)=3, then the gatekeeper's fee depends
only on the monopoly price r and the fraction S of shoppers in the market. It is independent of the
allocation of the 1 ¡ S loyal customers across the two ¯rms. Reasoning for this result is explored
in more detail in Section 5 below.
5 Equilibrium
In this section we utilize the results from Propositions 6 and 11 to characterize the equilibrium
strategies as a function of the exogenous parameters r; L1; L2; and S; and to conduct comparative
statics analysis. The equilibrium strategies are found by substituting the optimal advertising fee
©¤ derived in Proposition 11 into the ¯rm strategies derived in Proposition 6.











































If L1 ¸ 1=3 + 2L2=3; then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which
©
¤ =
rS (L1 ¡ L2)





































2L1 + S ¡ L2
:
As might be expected, when compared with the equilibrium in Narasimhan's model, pricing
behavior is less competitive when ¯rms can choose not to advertise. In particular, the expected
price charged by either ¯rm in a market with a gatekeeper is higher than the expected price charged
by the corresponding ¯rm when advertising is compulsory.10 As mentioned in subsection 3.2, when
the option to advertise is introduced, ¯rm 1 protects the pro¯t opportunity represented by its larger
loyal customer base by advertising less frequently than ¯rm 2: As shown in proposition 12, ®¤
1 < ®¤
2.
Narasimhan ¯nds that ¯rm 1 protects this pro¯t opportunity by advertising a higher price (on
average) than ¯rm 2 to avoid selling at a discounted price to its larger loyal base. However, when
the advertising decision is endogenous, ¯rm 1 protects the pro¯t opportunity represented by its
large loyal base by advertising less frequently and selling to its loyal customers at the reservation
10This follows from the fact that in Narasimhan's model ®i = 1 for i = 1;2 by assumption, and that the equilibrium
price distribution ®iFi(p) over the interval (p;r) in our model is strictly less than the equilibrium price distribution
over this interval for the corresponding ¯rm in Narasimhan's model. In addition, while the upper support of the
equilibrium price distributions is r in both models, the lower support in a market without a gatekeeper is strictly
less than p:
15price r. When ¯rm 1 does advertise, it does so with the intent of capturing shoppers by pricing
more competitively than ¯rm 2 as re°ected in the fact that F ¤
1(p) > F ¤
2(p):
We can also consider the role of the gatekeeper on the ¯rms' incentive compete by utilizing the
gatekeeper's services. Narasimhan ¯nds that ¯rm 2 prefers the Nash game over collusion when ¯rm
1's loyal segment is relatively large (in particular if L1 > 2L2):11 In a market with a gatekeeper both
¯rms always prefer the collusive outcome over the Nash game.12 Firm 2's preference for the Nash
game when L1 is large disappears because although there is a bene¯t to ¯rm 2 from advertising
aggressively to capture shoppers, the gatekeeper is able to extract much of this bene¯t through
the advertising fee. As a result, both ¯rms achieve higher pro¯ts if they choose not to advertise.
However, the collusive outcome is not an equilibrium of the game in which collusion is an option
because if either ¯rm advertises with probability zero, the gatekeeper will establish an advertising
fee such that the other ¯rm chooses to advertise with probability 1 and captures all of the shoppers.
The equilibrium results demonstrate that with a gatekeeper, the ¯rms do not engage in Bertrand
competition even as the proportion of shoppers becomes arbitrarily large. In particular, as S ! 1;
we have L1 < 1=3+2L2=3: Thus, Proposition 12 implies ®2 ! 1=2 = ®1; the equilibrium advertised
price distributions both converge to F1(p) = F2(p) = 1 ¡ (r ¡ p)=p, and the minimum price p !
r=2: The advertising fee ©¤ ! r=4; the expected pro¯ts of both ¯rms converge to r=4; and the
gatekeeper's expected pro¯t is r=4 as well. As S ! 1; the equilibrium price is strictly greater than
the Bertrand price of 0; and both of the ¯rms and the gatekeeper earn strictly positive expected
pro¯ts. These results stand in stark contrast to the results of Narasimhan and other equilibrium
search models in which the equilibrium converges to Bertrand competition as S ! 1: More generally,
it can be shown that the expected price in a market with a gatekeeper is strictly greater than the
expected price in the Narasimhan model.13 As S ! 0; the gatekeeper becomes irrelevant (the
optimal advertising fee ©¤ ! 0); and the equilibrium converges to the collusive outcome in which
11If L1 is small (L1 < 2L2), then both ¯rms prefer the collusive outcome in Narasimhan's model.
12If the ¯rms collude by choosing not to advertsis and posting the reservation price r; then pro¯t for each ¯rm is
E¼N
i (r) = (Li + S=2)r: Pro¯t in the equilibrium with the gatekeeper depends upon the size of the loyal segments L1
and L2: If L1 < 1=3+2L2=3; then E¼1 = (2SL1+3SL2+4L1L2+S
2)
4(L2+S) r and E¼2 = (L2 + S=4)r: If L1 ¸ 1=3+2L2=3, then
E¼1 = rL1 and E¼2 = (¡L
2
2+2L1L2+SL1)
S+2L1¡L2 r: Because L1 + S=2 > (2SL1+3SL2+4L1L2+S
2)
4(L2+S) and L2 + S=2 > L2 + S=4,
both ¯rms prefer the collusive outcome over the equilibrium with advertising if L1 < 1=3+2L2=3: Similarly, because
L1 + S=2 > L1 and L2 + S=2 > (¡L
2
2+2L1L2+SL1)
S+2L1¡L2 both ¯rms prefer the collusive outcome even if L1 ¸ 1=3 + 2L2=3:
13In particular, letting FN
1 and FN
2 denote the equilibrium price distributions of the ¯rm the the larger loyal base
and smaller loyal base, respectively, in Narasimhan's model, ®1F¤
1 < FN
1 ; and ®2F¤
2 < FN
2 ; so in a market with
a gatekeeper ¯rms place more weight on higher prices than they do in a market in which shoppers automatically
observe prices. Furthermore, the minimum advertised price is strictly greater in a market with a gatekeeper.
16neither ¯rm advertises and both charge the monopoly price r:
Proposition 12 also reveals interesting features of the impact of total surplus r and of the distri-
bution of customers across the three segments L1; L2; and S on equilibrium behavior. Regardless
of the size of the loyal segments L1 and L2; an increase in r has no impact on the equilibrium ad-
vertising probabilities ®¤
1 and ®¤
2: As r increases, ¯rms do not reduce their advertising probabilities
even though the surplus that can be extracted from loyal customers has increased. Rather, as r
increases, both ¯rms adopt less competitive advertised price strategies so that the expected revenue
from capturing shoppers increases.14 Reducing ®¤
i as r increases is not optimal because doing so
would limit the ¯rm's chance of capturing shoppers to whom a higher price is being charged (on
average). As expected, an increase in r increases pro¯t for both ¯rms and the gatekeeper.
Comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium strategies with respect to L1; L2; and S is
complicated by the fact that the overall market size is ¯xed. As a result, an increase in the size of
any one of the three market segments requires a reduction in at least one of the other two segments.
The the ¯nal reallocation of customers must be accounted for in the comparative statics analysis.
The comparative statics results for each of the equilibrium strategies presented in Proposition 12
with respect to L1; L2; and S are presented in the Appendix.
Many of these comparative statics results are consistent with expectations. For example, if the
di®erence in loyal customer segments is small, so L1 < 1=3 + 2L2=3; then an increase in ¯rm 2's
loyal base L2 causes ¯rm 2 to reduce its advertising probability ®¤
2 and to price less competitively
when it does advertise (dF2=dL2 < 0 and dp=dL2 > 0): Somewhat less obvious is the fact that ¯rm
1 also will price less competitively when L2 increases (dF1=dL2 < 0), even if the increase in ¯rm
2's loyal base is the result of a direct transfer of customers from ¯rm 1 to ¯rm 2. An increase in
the proportion S of shoppers in the market leads to more competitive advertised prices. These
results also suggest that dispersion in advertised prices decreases as L2 increases but increase as S
increases. The impact of an increase in ¯rm 1's loyal segment is more complex. If a su±ciently large
fraction of the increase in L1 is the result of a transfer from ¯rm 2's loyal segment, then both ¯rms
will price more competitively, the minimum price will decrease, and price dispersion will increase.
However, if a relatively large fraction of the increase in L1 comes from S; then ¯rm 1 prices less
competitively and p increases. Firm 2 adjusts its advertised price distribution by placing less weight
in the tails of the distribution; F2(p) decreases for small values of p less than some critical value ^ p
14In particular, the lower support p of the advertised price distributions is increasing in r and both F1(p) and
F2(p) are decreasing in r:
17and increases for p > ^ p:
If the di®erence in the size of the two ¯rms' loyal segments is large, so L1 ¸ 1=3 + 2L2=3;
then only an increase in L1 has an unambiguous impact on pricing behavior. As L1 increase, ¯rms
price less competitively in equilibrium. This is driven by ¯rm 1's incentive to forego advertising
(d®¤
1=dL1 < 0) and charge the monopoly price to its growing loyal customer base. As ¯rm 1
advertises less aggressively, ¯rm 2 adopts a less competitive advertised price distribution in order
to collect higher prices from the shoppers it is now more likely to capture.
The equilibrium results also enable us to consider whether an increase in the proportion of
shoppers makes ¯rms better or worse o®. While one might expect that an increase in S leads
to more competitive pricing and results in a transfer of surplus from ¯rms to the gatekeeper and
consumers, this is not always the case. If L1 < 1=3+2L2=3; then ¯rm 2's expected pro¯t is increasing
in S if less than 1=4 of the increase in S comes from ¯rm 2's loyal base. While ¯rm 2's loyal base
is slightly diminished, it is more than able to make up for the loss in loyal customers by capturing
the now larger pool of shoppers. Similarly, if a large fraction of the increase in S comes from ¯rm
2's loyal base, then it is possible for ¯rm 1's pro¯t to increase as S increases. If L1 ¸ 1=3 + 2L2=3;
then an increase in S always reduces ¯rm 1's pro¯t, but ¯rm 2's pro¯t is still increasing in S if
a su±ciently small fraction of the increase in S comes from L2: Not surprisingly, in all cases, an
increase in S is bene¯cial to the gatekeeper.
6 Conclusions
We consider a duopoly market in which two ¯rms, 1 and 2; have asymmetric loyal market shares,
L1 and L2; with L1 > L2; and a fraction S of the population shops for the lowest price advertised
through an information gatekeeper. Our analysis demonstrates that in equilibrium the ¯rm with the
smaller loyal market is more likely to advertise its price to shoppers, but adopts a less competitive
advertised price distribution than the ¯rm with the larger loyal market. This contrasts with earlier
models by Narasimhan (1988) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992) which ¯nd that in the
absence of a gatekeeper, the ¯rm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing
strategy.
A market with a gatekeeper, provides ¯rms two strategic options, both pricing and advertising,
for balancing the trade-o® between competing for shoppers and charging a higher price to loyal,
non-shopping customers. In contrast to earlier models, we allow a ¯rm to choose not to advertise
18at all, in which case it sells only to its loyal customers. This strategy has the advantage of ex-
tracting the highest possible surplus from non-shopping, loyal customers, but it concedes shoppers.
We demonstrate that the ability to choose not to advertise leads to equilibrium pricing strategies
which di®er dramatically from the strategies found in the earlier literature. In particular, ¯rm 1's
advertised price is lower (on average) than ¯rm 2's. Because the opportunity cost of competing for
shoppers is higher for ¯rm 1, when it does advertise, ¯rm 1 prices more aggressively to ensure it
captures the shoppers. However, because ¯rm 1 has a larger loyal customer base, it is also more
likely than ¯rm 2 to simply choose not to advertise and to sell to its loyal customers at the monopoly
price. Firm 2, on the other hand, advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively. In this
sense ¯rm 2's strategy is consistent with a \puppy-dog" approach as characterized by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984). Firm 2 adopts a less competitive advertised price strategy so that in the event
that both ¯rms choose to advertise, ¯rm 2 appears less threatening to ¯rm 1. As a result, both
¯rms price less competitively than they would in the absence of a gatekeeper.
The fact that competition is less severe in a market with a gatekeeper does not imply that ¯rms
prefer operating in a market with a gatekeeper over a market in which shoppers readily observe all
prices. However, our analysis demonstrates that this is the case if the di®erence in the size of the
loyal market segments L1 and L2 is su±ciently small. If L1 < 1=4+3L2=4; then both ¯rms are better
o® in a market with a gatekeeper. Such market conditions would support a collaborative e®ort by
¯rms to develop a gatekeeper institution which gives each ¯rm control over if and when its price is
advertised to shoppers. This may explain why several major airlines partnered to launch the travel
price comparison site Orbitz.com and why price comparison websites such as Shopper.com, where
prices are only advertised when submitted by a ¯rm, have persisted even with the development
of shopbot websites which use search technology to automatically collect prices from a number of
sellers at the shopper's request. If the di®erence in the size of the loyal segments is large, then
¯rm 1 still prefers a market with a gatekeeper, but ¯rm 2 is strictly better o® in a market in which
shoppers observe all prices.
197 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that ¯rm i adopts a pure pricing strategy pi when advertising.
Suppose that ¯rm j's advertised pricing strategy includes a minimum price (under either a mixed
or a pure strategy) of r ¸ pj > pi: Then ¯rm j makes sales to shoppers only if ¯rm i does not
advertise, which implies ¯rm j should employ a pure strategy of pj = r when it advertises. But
if ¯rm j adopts a pure strategy of pj = r when advertising, then ¯rm i can strictly increase its
expected pro¯t by raising its advertised price by some " > 0 su±ciently small so that pi+" < r = pj;
which implies ¯rm i's initial pure strategy is not optimal, so pj > pi cannot occur in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that ¯rm j's advertised pricing strategy includes a minimum price of pj < pi · r:
Then ¯rm j's expected pro¯t is strictly increasing in pj; so i's pure strategy cannot satisfy pj < pi:
Finally, suppose pj = pi. Then for " > 0 and su±ciently small
E¼
A





¡ "(Lj + S) > 0:
where the inequality follows from the facts that ®i > 0 by assumption and that " can be arbitrarily
small. Thus, pj = pi cannot occur in any equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that p
i < p




strictly increasing over this interval, so p
i < p
j is suboptimal for ¯rm i: ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. To verify that neither ¯rm can have a mass point in the interval [p;r);
suppose one ¯rm j has a mass point at a price pm where r > pm ¸ p: Then for " > 0; the expected
























If pm = p; then because Fj(pm)¡Fj (p¡) is at least as large as the strictly positive probability mass
assigned to the price pm; there exists an " > 0 such that E¼A
i (p¡) > E¼A
i (pm): But this implies
that p
i < p which contradicts Lemma 2, so ¯rm j cannot have a mass point at p. If pm > p; then in
order for both p+ and p¡ to be part of ¯rm i's equilibrium mixed pricing strategy, ¯rm i's expected
pro¯t must be equal for both of these prices. However, because ¯rm j has a mass point at pm; there
exists an " > 0 such that E¼A
i (p¡) > E¼A
i (p+); and ¯rm i will never choose to advertise in the
20interval [pm;p+]: But this implies that Fi(p) must be constant over the interval [pm;p+]; so ¯rm j
can strictly increase its expected pro¯t by shifting its mass point from pm to p+: This contradicts
our initial assumption that ¯rm j has a mass point at pm:
To verify that F must be continuous over [p;r]; ¯rst assume that neither ¯rm advertises a price
in the interval (pl;pu) where p · pl < pu · r: Because, as just shown, ¯rm j cannot have a mass
point at pl; for any p 2 [pl;pu); Fj(p) is a constant equal to Fj(pl): Thus, for any advertised prices
~ p 2 (pl;pu); E¼A
i (~ p) ¡ E¼A
i (pl) = (Li + (1 ¡ ®jFj (pl))S)(~ p ¡ pl) > 0; so ¯rm i would strictly
prefer advertising the price ~ p over the price pl which contradicts the assumption that neither ¯rm
advertises in the interval (pl;pu): Next, assume that only one ¯rm, j; chooses not to advertise in
some interval (pl;pu); so Fj(p) is a constant equal to Fj(pl) for all p 2 [pl;pu): This implies that for
any two prices p1 and p2 in (pl;pu) with p1 > p2 we have E¼A
i (p1) > E¼A
i (p2), so ¯rm i would never
advertise p2. But this contradicts the assumption that only ¯rm j chooses not to advertise prices
in the interval (pl;pu):
To verify that only one ¯rm can have a mass point at r; suppose that advertised pricing strategies
for both ¯rms have a mass point at ¹ p = r: Then, because each ¯rm's expected pro¯t is continuous
in its advertised price, there exists an " > 0 such that E¼A
i (¹ p ¡ ") ¡ E¼A
i (¹ p) > 0 for i = 1;2 ¥
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that one ¯rm j sets ®j = 0: Then the competing ¯rm i




i (r) ¡ E¼
N







r = rS=2 ¡ © > 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that © < rS=2 by assumption. Thus, if ¯rm j sets ®j = 0;
then ¯rm i will set ®i = 1 and advertise a price pi = r: However, if ¯rm i follows this strategy, then
by advertising a price r ¡ " with probability ®j = 1; where " > 0 is small, ¯rm j gains
E¼
A
j (r) ¡ E¼
N
j (r) = (S + Lj)(r ¡ ") ¡ © ¡ Ljr = rS ¡ (S + Lj)" ¡ © > rS=2 ¡ (S + Lj)" > 0
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that © < rS=2; and the second inequality follows
from " being arbitrarily small. Thus, ¯rm j will prefer to deviate from ®j = 0 so it is optimal for
both ¯rms to advertise with strictly positive probability.
Next, suppose ®1 = ®2 = 1: Then the return for each ¯rm i must satisfy E¼A






: If neither ¯rm has a mass point at r or if ¯rm i but not ¯rm j has a mass point at
21r (recall that Lemma 3 implies that at most one ¯rm can have a mass point at r); then because
Fj(r) = 1 and ®j = 1;
E¼
A
i (r) ¡ E¼
N
i (r) = rLi ¡ © ¡ rLi = ¡© < 0
which implies E¼A
i (r) < E¼N
i (r); so ¯rm i prefers not to advertise. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. Proposition 5 implies ®1 < 1: This implies ~ p1 ¸ ~ p2: First consider
possible equilibria with ®2 = 1: If ®2 = 1; then ~ p2 · ~ p1 simpli¯es to
rL2 + 1






Because ¯rm 1 sets ®1 < 1; ¯rm 1 must be indi®erent between advertising and not advertising.
This implies E¼N
1 (r) = E¼A
1 (p) or, when ®2 = 1;
p(L1 + (1 ¡ F2(p))S) ¡ © = L1r: (5)
It follows that the equilibrium advertised price distribution F2(p) of ¯rm 2 must satisfy
F2(p) = 1 ¡
L1(r ¡ p) + ©
pS
Lemma 3 implies F2(p) = 0; which implies p =
rL1+©
L1+S : Furthermore, F2(r) = 1 ¡ ©
rS; so ¯rm 2's
mixed advertised price distribution has a mass point at the reservation price r; whence Lemma
3 implies F1(r) = 1 because only one ¯rm can have a mass point at r. Because ¯rm 2 must be
indi®erent between advertising any price in the support of its distribution, we have E¼A
2 (p) =
E¼A
2 (r): Substituting F1(r) = 1; this implies
p(L2 + S) ¡ © = r(L2 + (1 ¡ ®1)S) ¡ ©:









2 (p) = E¼A
2 (p) implies
p(L2 + (1 ¡ ®1F1(p))s) ¡ © = p(L2 + s) ¡ ©:
Substituting the expression for p and solving for F1(p) yields
F1(p) =




22It is easy to verify that F1(p) = 0 and F1(r) = 1. Finally, substituting the expression for ®1 into
equation (4) implies © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2: Otherwise the condition ~ p2 · ~ p1 is violated.
Now suppose ®2 < 1: Because ®1 < 1 also must hold in any equilibrium, the arguments in the
proof of Proposition 5 imply that in equilibrium we must have ~ p1 = ~ p2, which is equivalent to
rL1 + 1




2rS(1 ¡ ®1) + ©
L2 + S
: (6)
Because both ¯rms must adopt mixed advertised price distributions, in any equilibrium E¼A
1 (p) =
E¼A
1 (p) and E¼A
2 (p) = E¼A
2 (p) or
pL1 + pS(1 ¡ ®2F2(p)) ¡ © = p(L1 + S) ¡ © (7)
pL2 + pS(1 ¡ ®1F1(p)) ¡ © = p(L2 + S) ¡ © (8)
In addition, because both ¯rms adopt mixed advertising strategies, both ¯rms must be indi®erent
between advertising and not advertising so E¼N
i (r) = E¼A
i (p) for any p 2 [p;r]: This implies
p(Li + (1 ¡ ®jFj(p))S) ¡ © = Lir +
1
2
(1 ¡ ®j)rS: (9)
At this point, it is not clear whether either ¯rm will have a mass point at r: Lemma 3 implies there
are three possibilities; ¯rm 1 has a mass point, ¯rm 2 has a mass point, or neither ¯rm has a mass
point. If neither ¯rm has a mass point, then F1(r) = F2(r) = 1; and when evaluated at the price
r equation (9) implies ®1 = ®2 = 1 ¡ 2©
rS: But, substituting ®1 = ®2 = 1 ¡ 2©
rS into equation (6)
yields L1 = L2 which contradicts our assumption that L1 > L2: Thus, exactly one ¯rm must have
a mass point at r: Suppose ¯rm 1 has a mass point at r: Letting j = 1 and i = 2 in equation (9)





rL2 ¡ pL2 + 1
2rS(1 ¡ ®1) + ©
pS
): (10)
Similarly, letting j = 2 and i = 1 yields ®2 = 1 ¡ 2©
rS: Substituting this expression for ®2 into
equation (6), solving for ®1; and substituting this expression into equation (10) yields
F1(p) =
r(pSL1 + pS2 + pL1L2 + pL2S ¡ rL1L2 ¡ 2©S ¡ rSL1 ¡ 2©L2)
p(rS ¡ 2©)(2L2 + S ¡ L1)
:
But this implies F1(r) =
S+L2
S+2L2¡L1 > 1 which contradicts the de¯nition of a cumulative distribution
function. It follows that ¯rm 2's equilibrium advertised price distribution must have a mass point
at r: This implies F1(r) = 1; so




23Substituting this expression for ®1 into equation (6) yields
®2 =
(rS ¡ 2©)(2L1 + S ¡ L2)
rS(L2 + S)
:
Substituting ®1 = 1 ¡ 2©
rS into equation (8) and evaluating at p = p (note that lemma 3 implies
F1(p) = 0) yields p =
rL2+2©
L2+S : Finally, substituting the expressions for ®1; ®2 and p into equations
(7) and (8) generates the expressions for F1(p) and F2(p) stated in the Proposition. Notice that
the solution satis¯es required properties. Given the assumption that © < rS=2; it follows that
0 < ®1 < 1 and that ®2 > 0: Also, it can be veri¯ed that F1(p1) = F2(p2) = 0; F1(r) = 1; and
F2(r) =
L1+S
2L1+S¡L2 < 1. Therefore, at equilibrium, ¯rm 2 will have mass point at r and ¯rm 1 will
not have positive density at r. Finally, to see that the equilibrium with ®2 < 1 only applies if
© >
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2, note that ®2 ¸ 1 if © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2: ¥
Proof of Proposition 11. Since the equilibrium ¯rm behavior depends upon the gatekeepers
fee ©; the approach of the proof is to ¯nd the optimal fee ¯rst constraining © to the range in
which ®2 = 1; or 0 < © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2; and then constraining © to the range in which ®2 < 1; or
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 < © < rS=2; and then to note that the optimal fee corresponds to the local maximum
which generates the greatest pro¯t for the gatekeeper.
Recall that the gatekeeper's expected pro¯t is
E¼G = (®1 + ®2)© ¡ k:
Suppose 0 < © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2: Then Proposition 6 implies ®1 =
L2+S
L1+S(1 ¡ ©











Maximizing subject to the constraint that 0 < © ·
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 yields a corner solution ©¤ =
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2:








2L1+S¡L2 · © < rS=2: Then Proposition 6 implies ®1 = 1 ¡ 2©











Maximizing with respect to © subject to the constraint that
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 < © < rS=2 yields ©¤ = rS
4
if rS=4 > rS
L1¡L2
2L1+S¡2L2, i:e:, if L1 < (1 + 2L2)=3. Furthermore, if L1 < (1 + 2L2)=3; then the
24gatekeeper's expected pro¯t from setting ©¤ = rS=4 is 1
4rS
L1+S
L2+S which exceeds the expected pro¯t
from setting a fee of
rS(L1¡L2)
2L1+S¡L2 at the corner solution with ®2 = 1: Therefore, if L1 < (1 + 2L2)=3;then
©¤ = rS=4 is the advertising fee that achieves a global maximum of the gatekeeper's expected pro¯t.
On the other hand, if L1 ¸ (1 + 2L2)=3; then the constrained maximization yields ©¤ =
rS(L1¡L2)
(1+L1¡2L2),
which is the same solution when ®2 = 1: As a result, it will also be the global maximum. ¥
Comparative Statics Results for Section 5
Equilibrim Comparative Statics if L1 < 1=3 + 2L2=3
With respect to
Change In L1 L2 S
©¤ 0 if dS
dL1 = 0, ¡ if dS
dL1 < 0 0 if dS
dL1 = 0; ¡ if dS
dL2 < 0 +
®¤
1 0 0 0
®¤





F1 + i®. dS
dL1 > ¡S
L2+S ¡ +











dF2=dL1 > 0 i®. p > ^ p:
p + i®. dS
dL1 < ¡S
L2+S + ¡
Equilibrim Comparative Statics if L1 ¸ 1=3 + 2L2=3
With respect to
Change In L1 L2 S
©¤ + i® dS


















2 0 0 0
F1 ¡ + i® dS
dL2 > ¡3S
2(L1+S)¡L2 +
























dF2=dL2 > 0 i® p > ^ p: dF2=dL2 > 0 i® p < ^ p
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